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Abstract: Within analysis of European integration, the distinction between a ‘social 
Europe’ and a ‘neo-liberal’ one blocks analysis of what and who have actually built the 
European Union (EU) of today. Similarly, an analysis solely in terms of EU vs member 
state competency does not further research in this area either. To better answer the 
question why the EU has such a feeble social policy one needs instead to embrace a 
political economy of European integration which simultaneously tackles the fields 
(Economic, Bureaucratic, Party political and Expertise) within which the possibility of 
EU social policy has been discussed, then how scales of government have affected 
these debates and negotiations. From there one can ascertain how and why the best-
resourced actors involved have worked politically to narrow the definition of ‘the 
social’ as a European problem and restrict its instrumentation. This claim will be 
illustrated using empirical examples from the health industry in the early 1950s and 
2010s.   
 
Introduction 
 
The weakness of European Union’s (EU) social policies in comparison to national ones is well 
known throughout academia and a wider public. Explanation, however, is generally reduced 
to ‘what the treaties say’ or the power of national governments on the one hand and, on the 
other, to a liberal bias allegedly built into the EU from the outset (Copeland, 2019). More 
precisely, the weakness of EU measures categorized as ‘social’ is attributed to legislation 
which has conserved power to develop such interventions at the national scale, whilst 
transferring responsibility for much of ‘economic’ policy to the European scale of 
government. 
 
These beliefs and arguments are not in themselves wrong. However, they not only overlook 
why the treaties took the form they did and national governments retain such high levels of 
power in this issue area. They also reflect and perpetuate a superficial and misleading 
conception of what social policies are, how they relate to ‘the economic’ and the 
relationship of both to the capitalisms within and across which the EU has been built. 
 
This paper is an attempt to develop an alternative explanation of why the EU’s ‘social 
policies’ are so feeble which draws upon a constructivist and institutionalist political 
economy approach to policy-making which guides research around two concepts: ‘fields’ 
and ‘political work’ (section 1). From there, using cases from the health industry in the early 
1950s (section 2) then 2010s (section 3), it will be argued that social policy in the EU remains 
essentially national because, throughout its history and within specific fields of asymmetric 
power relations, the best-resourced actors involved have worked politically to narrow the 
definition of the European ‘social problem’ and curtail its instrumentation. In short, EU social 
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policy is so weak because of how capitalism has been structured throughout Western 
Europe since at least 1945, and this due to the positions and dispositions of the actors from 
the Economic and Bureaucratic fields who have dominated its institutions and regulation.  
 
 
1. Studying the Social within Political Economies:  
A Constructivist-Institutionalist Approach 
 
Elsewhere a sustained and systematic argument has been made in favour of both 
generalizing constructivist and institutionalist analysis within studies of political economy 
and policymaking (Hay, 2016; Smith, 2016), then applying this in particular to the EU (Jullien 
& Smith, 2014). As our previous research has shown in a wide variety of cases (notably 
agriculture, wine, whisky, defence, pharmaceuticals), socio-economic activity takes place 
and is ‘regularized’ (Boyer, 2015) within social spaces we have theorized as ‘industries’. 
Beyond common parlance, using industry as a concept enables research to grasp each 
specialized variant of socio-economic activity as being simultaneously a ‘productive system’ 
(typically involving financiers, producers and distributors) and an ‘institutional order’ 
(implicating interest groups and public authorities). Indeed, as Boyer himself has consistently 
underlined, what gives regularity to socio-economic activity are institutions, i.e. the sets of 
stabilized rules, norms and conventions which both constrain what actors such as private 
companies can do (e.g. make Scotch whisky only in Scotland), but also provide them with the 
very conditions that enable them to durably invest, produce and sell their products and 
services (e.g. by defining property rights). Indeed, all industries are recurrently structured by 
four sets of ‘institutionalized relationships’ which concern: i) property and finance; ii) 
employment; iii) production and iv) commercialization (Jullien & Smith, 2011 & 2014). 
Crucially, these relationships are never purely ‘Economic’. On the contrary they all contain 
both a strong social dimension, due to their constant interplay with societal structures, and 
politics - precisely because, in each of the four sets of institutions, antagonistic social 
constructions shape actor perceptions, preferences, strategies and behaviour.  
 
As regards the focus of this paper, what is important to highlight is that public policies either 
attempt to group together existing socio-economic institutions in new ways in order to 
reorient activity in an industry (e.g. the EU’s 2008 reform of its wine policy), or to change 
specific industrial institutions (e.g. the introduction of market authorizations for 
pharmaceuticals in the early 1970s). What is crucial to research, however, is less the public 
policy as an output of complex decision-making, and more the actual degree of institutional 
change realized (our dependent variable) and, above all, its deeper causes1. Rather than 
                                                     
1
 By studying industries and their institutionalizations over time in this way, for example, in the case of the European wine 
industry we refuted analysis which had over-hastily attributed its change to ‘globalization’ and increased market-share 
taken by New World wines. We showed instead and why how institutions in this industry concerning market access and 
marketing had been modified alongside those concerning finance, before subsequently impacting upon others that concern 
production and employment. This shift co-related with shifts in power relations within the Fields of both Expertise (the rise 
of neo-classical economics, bio-chemistry and wine marketing) and the Economic (the empowerment of large wine 
merchants) (Itçaina, Roger & Smith, 2016).  Similarly, in the case of governing medicines in France we showed that this did 
not change in the early 2000s simply as a reaction to ‘scandals’ over specific drugs, nor because of public policies hurriedly 
put in place to mitigate against them. Instead, our theory enabled us to show that institutions structuring the market access 
of medicines had become destabilized, leading in turn to a revision in the way the very production of these goods was 
regulated, as well as having knock on effects upon investment and employment practices. Simultaneously and more deeply, 
here institutional change co-related with a shift within the Expertise field (the strengthening of epidemiologists vs. clinical 
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repeat this ontological argument in its entirety, this section presents instead two concepts –
fields and political work- which, as independent variables, translate my ontology of the 
socio-economic into the causal analytical framework that will be deployed in section 2. 
 
Fields as the underlying structures of socio-economic activity 
 
The first such concept, that of ‘fields’, provides a means of grasping how socio-economic 
spaces are structured by power relations which are invariably asymmetric (Bourdieu, 1992).  
A field denotes a space in which actors possessing varying types and amounts of resources 
(or ‘capital’) struggle to determine, then assert their relative value. Often corresponding 
more or less to a profession (e.g. medical science), each field possesses a specific hierarchy, 
set of recurrent issues, ‘rules of the game’ and ‘common sense’ (Mérand, 2015. Competition 
within each field is often ferocious, but is nearly always channelled within and by these 
parameters. Thinking in terms of fields therefore guides research, to identify ‘both ‘a Field of 
forces’ that is structured by the objective distribution of different types and amounts of 
material, relational and symbolic capital, and a ‘Field of struggle’ that is driven by 
confrontations that seek to define the most legitimate capital portfolio and disqualify those 
of others’ (Itçaina, Roger & Smith, 2016: 38; Bourdieu, 1993: 30). Empirical description of 
each Field is achieved by studying the objective distribution of different material and 
symbolic capitals, together with the positions of each actor as regards others. Here their 
respective position as regards their industry’s institutions, and degree of power over them, 
provides a means of assessing their capital. This analysis is best achieved through the 
production of institutional change or stasis over time, combined with organizational histories 
via careful readings of actor biographies, statistics, the specialized press and interviews. 
 
To conduct such analysis, one needs to produce data on four fields which have affected 
European integration from the outset: the Economic, the Party-political, the Bureaucratic 
and that of ‘expertise’. 
- The Economic field is made up of all the actors and organizations who participate in 
the financing, production and distribution of goods or services – activities which in 
turn reflect a segmentation of the field around specific industries. Formally, actors in 
this field may be ‘public’ or ‘private’, meaning that this categorization has no 
automatic impact upon their positioning within it. What counts instead is quite 
simply the amount and types of capital they have accumulated over time. At least in 
the case of post-1945 Europe, the Economic field is unsurprisingly one that has 
consistently featured a strong transnational aspect, but this however without it 
subsuming its national ‘counterpart’; 
- As regards the Party-political field, the most obvious form of capital is electoral 
support, particularly when it translates into resources for having influence within the 
executives of public authorities (national governments, but also sub-national ones). 
Of course, electoral strength depends in turn upon how the parties concerned have 
rooted themselves within their respective polities. Despite undergoing a degree of 
growth in transnationalism since the first European Parliament elections in 1979, in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
scientists), but also entailed depowering within the Bureaucratic field (the national drugs agency and the Ministry of 
Health) and repowering within the fields of journalism (strengthening an investigatory specialized press) and Party Politics 
(Ansaloni, Pariente & Smith, 2018). 
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Europe the Party-political field clearly remains overwhelmingly dominated by capital 
that is developed, reproduced and activated at the national or sub-national scales; 
- As alluded to above, such activation however entails constant mediations with the 
Bureaucratic field, i.e. one made up of the individuals and organizations who 
participate on a daily basis in the public authorities formally charged with 
formulating and implementing policies. In virtually all member states and at the scale 
of the EU, in quantitative terms career civil servants dominate the Bureaucratic field. 
Through their selection, training and tenure, these actors possess particular forms of 
material, symbolic and relational capital of which a certain quantity, to be assessed 
empirically, is developed at the scale of the EU. Nevertheless, of course, these 
bureaucrats seldom monopolise policy-making and thus the change or reproduction 
of socio-economic institutions; 
- Indeed, if input from actors located principally in the Economic and Party-political 
fields are either partners or competitors to civil servants for the making of policy, this 
process is also generally affected by actors from a fourth and final field, that of 
‘Expertise’. In many instances, actors considered to be experts in specific domains 
are formally scientists (e.g. the input of medical science into the market 
authorization of pharmaceuticals or economists into competition policy 
administration) (Laurent, 2019). However, actors can also be constituted as ‘experts’ 
via other sources of capital. In the EU, this has notably been the case for lawyers and 
other members of the legal profession (Vauchez, 2015). 
  
More generally, and contrary to many usages of the concept of a field (notably those of 
Bourdieu and his followers), it is vital to embrace the finding that fields are not inevitably 
delimited by national frontiers. Instead, it is more heuristic to consider that each field itself 
has no frontiers, but rather that capital relevant to different scales of regulation (the global, 
the European, the national, the local) strongly influences its respective morphology. The first 
pay-off for analysing specific components of European integration from this angle is that it 
enables research to map the actors involved and their respective capital over time, and this 
without assuming from the outset that national frontiers determine their power, their 
perceptions and their preferences. Capital developed in a national setting clearly impacts 
upon the respective power of each actor. For example, within the Bureaucratic field the 
Minister for Health in a large member state such as Germany obviously has more capital 
than their counterpart in Estonia. Nevertheless, national resources are generally less directly 
powerful in fields such as the Economic and that of Expertise. This is particularly important 
when one seeks to incorporate into analysis the transnational character of capitalism and, 
therefore, the tensions with national governmental organizations this form of political 
economy inevitably generates2.  
 
In summary, a major contribution field theory can make to studies of the EU is to guide 
research to think again about these tensions between actors seeking to govern socio-
                                                     
2
 In Euroclash (2008), Neil Fligstein deployed the concept of fields in an effort to capture their transnational character. 
Nevertheless, often he fell into the trap of separating ‘national’ from ‘European’ fields, both conceptually and empirically. 
Moreover, his approach to fields is deeply interactionist and thus quite different from the structuralist definition adopted 
here and by authors such as Bourdieu. Consequently, he depicts the EU as a myriad of micro-fields (e.g. one for each 
market) whose membership is flexible and hierarchies are in constant flux. By contrast, the conception of fields adopted in 
this paper envisages them instead as far less numerous and highly structured by ‘sticky’ power relations which render 
change improbable but not impossible.  
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economic activity at the national or European scales on the one hand and, on the other, the 
financing, production and commercial activities of contemporary businesses and various 
other units of collective action (interest groups, union movements, etc.). As Figure 1 strives 
to encapsulate, at least in the case of the EU, conceptualizing the structuration of socio-
economic activity using fields provides a dynamic means of mapping the actors involved in 
the making of policy at national and European scales over time, and this in terms of their 
respective capital, positions and consequent power relations (Georgakakis & Rowell, 2013). 
From there one now needs to theorize how actors mobilize to maximize their power over 
institutions within and across fields.   
 
Figure 1: Socio-economic policymaking in Europe as a terrain affected by four fields 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: _____ = regular contact & information flows; -------- = intermittent contact and flows of information 
 
 
Political work: studying (re)institutionalizations sociologically 
 
What even thick descriptions of the capital held by actors in different fields lack is any 
theorization of the cause of change, and that of the institutions of their respective industry 
in particular. Specifically, have institutions changed or been reproduced because of shifts 
within and between Fields, or vice versa? Rather than opt for either of these extreme 
positions, the alternative defended here is that institutional and Field change occurs 
simultaneously and is therefore co-produced.  
 
Crucially, however, ‘co-constitution’ is not the end of the story and, therefore, describing 
this process ‘thickly’ is not as far as research should go. Rather, envisaging institutional and 
Field change as dialectical implies that analysis simply must supplement the structuralist 
tools of Field and institutional analysis with others from sociological forms of constructivism 
(Mangenot & Rowell, 2010) which guide research to produce data on the work of 
institutionalization. The key to developing such data is the concept of ‘social representation’ 
(Hall, 1997). The constructivism behind this concept stresses firstly that how actors interpret 
the world is structured by subjective representations of reality as it is, but also as it could be 
The Economic 
The Party Political 
The Bureaucratic 
Expertise 
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(i.e. what is represented as ‘necessary’ as regards, the past, the present and the future). 
Secondly, this constructivism focuses analysis upon how certain representations become 
social (i.e. inter-subjective) through discussion, co-operation, powering and conflict. At least 
in the case of change or stasis within the institutions and fields that structure the economic, 
these processes entail three deeply recurrent forms of actor work I have defined elsewhere 
as political: problematization, instrumentation and legitimation (Smith, 2019 & 2014).   
 
Constructing public problems: Just as Fields do not change because their asymmetries are 
criticized as unfair, institutions do not change just because some actors consider they have 
become sub-optimal. Instead, both potentially evolve only when the issue in question has 
been defined and framed in ways that render possible its fuelling of actor mobilizations. 
Indeed, to succeed this first step must then produce a second which codifies the issue into a 
‘problem’ widely deemed deserving of public action (Gusfield, 1981; Rochefort & Cobb, 
1994). For example, in the case of wine’s institutional change alluded to above, change was 
predicated upon the public problem shifting from one of encouraging demand to meet 
supply (1970s-2003/6) to that of inciting producers to meet demand (2006 >). Here, not only 
were the categories of demand and supply redefined, but the responsibilities of public 
authorities and wine producers were significantly reframed. In so doing, capital was 
redistributed within the Bureaucratic and Economic fields, as well as in that of Expertise.     
 
Calibrating policy instruments: In practice, defining such public problems goes hand in hand 
with the development and proposition of policy tools aimed at ‘solving’ them. Analytically, 
however, it is heuristic to study instrumentation as a separate process because it often 
involves different sets of actors, sometimes located in different fields and using other lines 
of argumentation (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007). In the case researched on reforming 
government of medicines in France alluded to above, for example, epidemiologists located 
in the Expertise field worked to re-instrument the national drug agency by proposing new 
types of data about the actual usage and effects of medicines sourced from their research, 
as well as the methodological tools used to generate it. Other actors simultaneously 
challenged the dominant influence of clinical science (and thus its emphasis on laboratory-
centred data) within the Bureaucratic Field, and this by translating that data and those 
methods into proposals for new administrative procedures. The point is that 
instrumentation is never a neutral process and can only be fully understood by closely 
retracing the work that it entails on the one hand, and the distribution of capital within fields 
it affects on the other.    
 
Legitimating problems and instruments: Crucially, problematization and instrumentation are 
not only cognitive and relational processes; they also contain a strong symbolic dimension. 
This is important because in order to achieve change in institutions and fields, convincing 
only technical specialists is rarely sufficient. Instead, work for change entails developing 
justifications, for example in terms of ‘economic necessity’ which appeal to a wider set of 
actors who also have a say in reinstitutionalizations and shifts in power relations (e.g. 
parliamentarians). Moreover, appeals for change which use symbols, rhetoric and ‘dramatic’ 
gestures are vital parts of legitimation that generally extends considerably beyond the 
technical (Lagroye, 1985). In the case of wine reform, biased depictions of ‘the new 
consumer’ were successfully brandished in order to convince producers, bureaucrats and 
politicians of the need for radical policy change. Similarly, reform of the government of 
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medicines in France took the shape it did partly due to the proposed redefinitions of 
problems and instruments being embellished by dramatizations of ‘drug scandals’ and 
‘bureaucratic bungling’.    
 
In summary, the causal claim I have sketched out in this section, and sought to encapsulate 
in figure 2, is that institutional and power relation change is always brought about as a result 
of work by actors which entails the three recurrent processes presented above. This work is 
strategic in the sense that most of the time the actors concerned develop aims about 
institutions and Fields, then seek to carry them out through problematization, 
instrumentation and legitimation. However, stating that this work is strategic does not imply 
that it is based purely upon ‘rational’ calculus of costs and benefits, nor that it can simply be 
analysed using the tools of rational choice theory. Because universal rationality is a fiction 
non-deterministic political science cannot accept or afford, the perceptions, preferences and 
strategies of actors must, instead, be reconstituted through fieldwork centred upon actor 
work which, as Djelic underlines, ‘is always embedded action’ (2010: 34). Indeed, in order to 
shed light upon what she calls the ‘interplay’ of this work ‘with power and conflict’ (p. 34-5), 
links must constantly be made to analysis in terms of fields and inter-field mediations. 
 
Figure 2: ‘Political work’ as the driver of institutional change and redistributions of capital within fields 
 
 
2. Explaining the Impotence of EU Health ‘Policy’ 
 
It is well known and documented that the Health industry in the EU continues to be 
governed essentially at the scale of the member states. This where most formal policies are 
set, budgets are generated and distributed, and the symbolism of each ‘welfare state’ has its 
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numerous effects. As will be shown below, the health dimension social policy is not without 
EU content and impact, but their effects on socio-economic activity are clearly much less 
than that of national institutions and actors. In order to explain the weakness of EU policy in 
the health industry, it is therefore important to examine political conflicts during which the 
institutions and fields which structure healthcare in Europe have been tilted so heavily 
towards the national scale. Using the analytical framework set out in section 1, this section 
outlines how and why the first of these conflicts took place in the 1950s (Davesne, 2017; 
Guigner, 2008). Drawing upon my own work on pharmaceuticals and their medico-economic 
evaluation in particular, it then proceeds to examine another more recent and surprising 
instance where EU-scale regulation has remained structurally weak. 
 
2.1 Missed beginnings: why ‘White Europe’ ended up melting away 
 
Although this is usually overlooked by standard histories of the EU, during the immediate 
post-war period when the CECA, Euratom and the CED were being devised, a series of actors 
also set in motion plans for a Communauté européenne de la santé (CES). Labelled at the 
time ‘White Europe’ (Europe blanche), or le pool blanc, the basic idea was to take the 
opportunity of the then ongoing nationalization of health systems in Europe to introduce 
European-wide measures to ‘mutalize’ improvements in health care and introduce ambitious 
preventive public health programmes. As Davesne highlights on the basis of archival 
evidence3, for health specialists the period 1945-53 was ‘an intense moment for the 
structuring of health and social policy systems’ which generated new political spaces for 
defining problems differently and setting new instruments (2017: 93). Of course, we know 
that in the end these proposals were decidedly unsuccessful. The standard narrative is that 
the advocates of ‘White Europe’ ran into incompatibilities between the new national health 
systems4, as well as a deep reluctance amongst foreign and prime ministers to give health 
the same priority as coal and steel or defence. Moreover, ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ 
theory has also been evoked in order to stress the importance of resistance from a variety of 
interest groups (ranging from doctors to chemical and pharmaceutical companies). The claim 
here is that the preferences of these groups became the preferences of their respective 
national governments (Davesne & Guigner, 2013). 
 
All these arguments and factors do indeed need to be taken seriously if one is to fully 
understand why ‘White Europe’ never came to be institutionalized. However, they can and 
should be marshalled differently in order to grasp why the health dimension of social policy 
never became ‘a European problem’ during this period and why, more fundamentally, the 
politics of capitalism at that time was its deepest cause. The story of the failure of ‘White 
Europe’ therefore needs retelling in terms of the fields, institutions and political work that 
structured and dynamized it. 
 
From this perspective, the best place to begin is in the Economic and Bureaucratic Fields 
where proposals for European health policies were initiated. As Davesne shows, these 
proposals grew from modest bilateral agreements over social security arrangements for 
                                                     
3
 He also cites the historian Stephan Pumberger (2010). 
4
 For example, in France ‘nationalization’ entailed more the unification of the social security system based upon 
contributor-funded insurance than the ‘statization’ introduced in the UK (Palier, 2005). In particular, this enabled general 
practitioners to preserve their private (libéral) status. 
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migrant workers made in 1948 between the governments of France, Belgium and Italy (p. 
96). Over the following three years, attempts to extent these arrangements to medical care 
were formulated by the Council of Europe. Meanwhile a network of ‘internationalist’ doctors 
initially concerned with limiting epidemics by treating all patients regardless of their 
nationality, and centred upon the Office international d’hygiene publique (based in Paris 
since 1907), sought to extend the then burgeoning World Health Organization to help 
reconstruct Europe by modernizing its health systems in a mutually dependent way. 
Analytically, this problem definition and proposals for new, European-wide policy 
instruments therefore had two loci: 
- Within the Economic field some employers (in need of migrant workers) and, more 
significantly, some health professionals (essentially public health-oriented doctors) 
began seeking to reposition themselves both nationally and at a European scale; 
- Within the Bureaucratic field, some senior civil servants within health ministries, and 
sometimes even their ministers pushed the ‘White Europe’ plan for reasons of policy 
substance and even ‘morals’5, but also because they saw it as a means of improving 
their then lowly position within the field as a whole. 
 
In concrete terms, in December 1952 political work undertaken by these actors generated a 
detailed (249 article) proposition by the French Ministry of health. Known as Le plan Ribeyre, 
this proposal advocated more intergovernmental cooperation over health insurance and 
medical research, but also a set of precise supranational and even federalist policy 
instruments which included: 
- a common market for medicines (harmonisation of their regulation and categories); 
- common standards for the training of doctors and other medical personnel; 
- a common plan for the production of health resources (e.g. Artificial respirators); 
- the building of European centres for applied medical research (by disease); 
- public health programmes, such as the fight against alcoholism. 
And all this to be run by a ‘High Authority’ for Health. 
 
However, the political work which surrounded this ambitious plan failed to attract either 
cognitive or relational support within the hierarchies of both the Bureaucratic and Economic 
fields. In the case of the former, Davesne relates (pg. 147-154) that even within France itself, 
virtually no inter-ministerial mediations were attempted in order to convince powerful 
actors in the Department of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to back the plan. 
Indeed, senior civil servants from the latter administration set themselves clearly against it. 
Even potential allies within the lowly Ministère du travail were neglected and thus never 
supported the initiative either. Moreover, as Ministers for Health, neither Ribeyre nor his 
successor Alfred Coste-Floret sought to open up an alternative ‘front’ within the Party 
Political Field, and this despite their receiving some support initially from Robert Schuman 
when he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. More significantly still, little preparation work was 
done with with the Health ministries and ministers of other European states meaning that, in 
the end, only Luxembourg’s government unreservedly supported the French plan, whilst the 
backing their Italian and Belgian counterparts was only lukewarm. 
 
                                                     
5
 For example, the French minister for health in 1951-52 then again in late 1953, Paul Ribeyre, declared that this 
‘community’ could not only work better than a CED but, because of its humanitarian aspect ‘the need to reduce human 
suffering’), it would have more popular resonance than either that ‘Community’ or the CECA (Davesne, 2017: 116-8). 
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Significantly, more frontal and deep opposition to the plan for a ‘White Europe’ emerged 
simultaneously then spread in the Economic field. Well resourced and positioned opponents 
in this field included German and Swiss chemical and pharmaceutical producers, anxious at 
that time to avoid any European-wide regulation of their industries which would limit the 
benefits of their respective comparative advantage. More generally, trans-industry 
representatives of Dutch business convinced their ministries of economics and foreign affairs 
to be highly critical of the plan because of what they saw as a tenuous link to the economic 
(Davesne, 2017: 156).   
 
In summary, given the power relations which structured both the Economic and the 
Bureaucratic fields in Western Europe in the late 1940s and the 1950s, together with the 
inability of ‘White Europe’s policy entrepreneurs to politicize and thus legitimize health as a 
European problem that demanded European instrumentation, the failure of this dimension 
of social policy to take root supranationally is unsurprising. What revisiting this historical 
episode using the concepts of fields and political work does enable us to grasp, however, are 
the deep causes of this flop. At that time, health care as a national public problem was in its 
infancy. Virtually no actors, not even partisans of ‘White Europe’ such as Ribeyre, framed 
health as an issue that was key to ‘economic’ reconstruction. Instead, as a public problem 
the economic was restricted to questions of production, sales and trade, thereby further 
institutionalizing a restricted, and essentially liberal, acceptation of the economic, at 
national scales, but also at that of the then emerging ‘Common Market’.      
 
 
2.2 When even ‘economics’ failed to legitimize an EU health policy: 2009-12 
 
Jumping ahead sixty years from the early 1950s, as regards the EU-health relationship much 
had of course changed in the interim. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s pharmaceuticals 
came to be regulated extensively at the EU scale (Hauray, 2006). Perhaps even more 
significantly for linkages between health and ‘the social’, this was also a period during which 
public health campaigns, such as the fight against tobacco addiction, also developed a 
European dimension. Indeed, as Guigner has underlined (2008), by this time framing 
improvements in health as a contribution to economic development had become a means of 
legitimizing and institutionalizing a succession of EU measures in this issue area.  
 
This said, studies I undertook with others in the early 2010s6 have shown that such visible 
linkages of health to economics do not in themselves mean that power relations in this 
domain had shifted significantly by then. Nor does it show that a form of EU social policy has 
been introduced ‘through the back door’ around measures to improve health care across 
Europe. Specifically, within a wider research project devoted to the EU’s government of 
industries (Jullien & Smith, 2014), when examining that of pharmaceuticals we came across 
an EU-wide initiative aimed at improving regulators’ capacity to assess the ‘medico-
economic’ added-value of each medicine, and this with a view to both reducing national 
expenditure on medicines and improving care for patients. What intrigued us in particular 
was on the one hand the commitment, and indeed the zeal, of the proponents of a 
                                                     
6
 This research featured around thirty interviews with actors located in Brussels, Paris, London and Prague. It was 
deepened, and indeed surpassed, by Cyril Benoît’s PhD. dissertation (2016) which entailed many more interviews and 
sophisticated bilbliometrical analysis. 
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European governmentalization of ‘Health Technology Assessment’ (HTA) and, on the other, 
the political work carried out by a series of actors to oppose their initiative. Ultimately the 
latter clearly won out over the former. Once again, what follows is therefore another 
instance of a failure to institutionalize a form of social policy at the EU scale. The concepts of 
fields and political work enable analysis to go beyond superficial readings of this story, and 
this to reveal instead the deeper power relations and forms of agency that were its 
underlying cause. 
 
The origins of medico-economic evaluation 
  
If the period 2009-12 is at the centre of our analysis, one needs to go back to 1973 to trace 
the beginnings of the HTA movement. These emerged around the first study of the medical 
and economic costs and benefits of a technological innovation, the CT Scanner7. Carried out 
by a team within the US’s Office for Technological Assessment (OTA), above all this study 
concluded that such costly devices were being introduced throughout the American health 
system without any prior evaluation or audit. This study was given widespread publicity and 
attracted attention from throughout the world8. Indeed, it became the catalyst for the 
development of an HTA segment within a transnational Field of expertise. In concrete terms, 
following an inaugural conference in Stockholm in 1979, actors located in this segment 
began to meet regularly in order to spread ‘the usage of evidence-based medicine in 
decision-making as a moral imperative’9. As one French expert involved from the outset 
stated on interview: 
 
« C’était un projet de gens qui cherchaient à créer un domaine, des gens tous ahuris par 
le fait qu’on décidait sans données et sans méthode. Le ministre de l’époque nous disait, 
‘moi je veux un outil, car je prends les décisions et je n’en sais rien’. Aujourd’hui, il faut 
imaginer un monde sans agence, un monde ou les médecins se permettait de dire à un 
ministre ‘vous êtes un salaud’ » (when he refused that the social security system 
reimburse patients for the costs of a medicine)10. 
 
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of its pioneers, it would be a mistake to consider that a 
homogenous transnational movement of experts then quickly and spontaneously 
institutionalized. In Sweden and the Netherlands this began to occur. But even in the 1990s, 
differences in objectives and methods meant that the movement’s ‘transnational scale was 
characterized by its hybridity, thereby creating a series of groupings that often fitted 
uneasily within the rhetoric that supposedly united them all’ (Benoît, 2016: 143). Despite all 
this, international conferences and specialized journals provided the means through which 
this segment of the Expertise field managed to hang together11. Indeed, what is important to 
                                                     
7
 Written essentially by David Banta, this text ended up being published anonymously in 1978 as an OTA report entitled 
Policy Implications of the Computed Tomography (CT) Scanner. 
8
 Interview with David Banta, Paris, 2012. 
9
 Banta et al. (2009: 68). See also Benamouzig & Paris (2007). 
10
 Interview with adviser to the French Minister of Health during the 1980s, Paris, mars 2012. 
11
 In 1985, representatives of several national governments created the International Society for Technology Assessment in 
Health Care (ISTAHC). Renamed Health Technology Assessment International (HTAi) in 2003, today this organization claism 
to have more than 1000 members from 59 pays. Since 1986 it has managed a journal - International Journal of Technology 
Assessment in Health Care (IJTAHC)- which is both ‘scientific’ and aimed at a more generalist public. In 1993 a organization 
bringing together national health regulatory agency was formed: the International Association of Agencies for Health 
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underline is that although in a handful of countries, HTA was beginning to attract supporters 
and build institutionalized bases within the Bureaucratic Field, consolidation within this 
space only began to take place as of the late 1990s. Meanwhile, HTA was having virtually no 
impact upon the Economic field. Because of their power as regards the health industry’s 
Institutional order, until the 2000s pharmaceutical companies and producers of medical 
devices were able to continue to propose their wares to regulatory agencies without them 
having to undergo any systematic medico-economic evaluation whatsoever.   
 
As regards the EU scale, activity on HTA was again restricted to the Field of expertise until 
the mid-2000s. Indeed, as some of the founders of HTA today repeatedly underline, building 
upon inclusion of public health in the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1991, initially officials in 
DG Research identified ‘value for money in health care’ as a priority. Subsequently from 
1994 to 1997 a first research project was funded by the EU’s framework programme: EUR-
ASSESS. Around 100 experts were involved in research focused upon the harmonization of 
methodologies for the evaluation of health care. Through attracting the support of key 
officials in DG research, the EUR-ASSESS project was followed by another (‘HTA-Europe’, 
1997-2000), then yet another: ‘European collaboration in HTA’ (ECHTA; 2000-2002). Not 
surprisingly, each of these three programmes concluded that more EU action was necessary 
on HTA. Indeed, the Commission even published the findings of the HTA-Europe project as 
an unofficial policy document. Moreover, ECHTA’s results lead to HTA being flagged as a 
priority issue to be dealt with in the EU’s FP 7 research programme. Accordingly, in 2005-8 
EU-wide collaboration was deepened by the launch of a ‘EUnetHTA’ joint project. Finally, 
this policy objective was then extended and made more ambitious in 2010-12 by a ‘Joint 
Action’, chaired this time by DG SANCO, that was inscribed in EU law within the ‘cross border 
care’ directive adopted in March 2011 (Directive 2011/24, article 15). Concretely, the Joint 
Action operated through annual conferences, work packages and the production of 
handbooks (e.g. on ‘core models’ or ‘capacity building’). Additional legitimacy for this 
development stemmed from the conclusions of the ‘High level European Forum on 
Pharmaceuticals’ published by the Commission in 2008. 
 
Overall then, co-operation over HTA at the European scale between 1990 and 2009 led to 
repositioning by a number of actors from different professions and disciplines (academics, 
employees of pharmaceutical and medical device companies, national agency staff) around 
the definition of a common, European public problem. Indeed, for the first time a significant 
set of actors within the Bureaucratic and Economic fields began to take seriously the 
possibility of a European-wide policy to introduce medico-economic evaluation. In short, by 
2009 HTA had come to be seen by health specialists throughout much of the EU not only as a 
set of policy instruments that would help make European health services more efficient and 
effective, but also as a range of solutions (to commonly defined ‘problems’) whose diffusion 
would be facilitated and enhanced by EU-backed co-operation. 
 
 
Why EU- shaped medico-economic evaluation has failed to institutionalize 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Technology Assessment (INAHTA). And, since 1995, an International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes 
Research (ISPOR) has also become a key venue for debate in this issue area. 
 13 
Indeed, when we began our empirical research in this area in 2010, HTA thus seemed to be a 
flagship initiative for DG SANCO around which its representatives were preparing to not only 
deepen co-operation between actors in the member states using their time-honoured 
methods (information generation, meetings, benchmarking, reports: Guigner 2008), but 
even to take on powerful actors within the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, shortly 
afterwards the Commission’s pharmaceuticals unit was shifted out of DG Enterprise and into 
DG SANCO, a move that many commentators saw as encouraging the emergence of a more 
distanced EU-wide approach to the contribution and costs of medicines within health care. 
However, and despite the adoption of the Joint Action in 2011, since then DG SANCO’s 
enthusiasm for HTA has waned. More precisely, the representatives of this administration 
have not only chosen to concentrate their efforts upon supporting co-operation over the 
therapeutic aspects of assessing health technologies, they have also firmly put aside 
‘medico-economics’12. This shift in Commission policy is born out by interviews with other 
EU scale actors, such as an official from the European Generics Association:  
 
‘DG SANCO has become more and more concerned with the safety aspects of 
medicines. (…) Indeed, within the current Joint Action, medico-economics is largely 
being taken out of the debates. Instead, everything has become about safety and 
efficacy’13. 
  
Recall that our research question here is why has this change of approach by DG SANCO, and 
more widely the Commission, taken place? At a time when the Commission as a whole has 
been urging health administrations in the member states to cut their budgets, why on earth 
did DG SANCO backtrack on medico-economic evaluations designed to improve cost-
effectiveness in the name of the public interest, and in so doing deepen a ‘social’ dimension 
of the health industry’s regulation? Our research here again underlines that both power 
relations and political work simply have to be combined in order to discover the deepest 
causes of this shift. 
 
As extremely well resourced actors within the Economic field, representatives of 
pharmaceutical companies have clearly sought to ‘tame’ HTA in the following two ways. 
First, they have worked to discourage further development of its medico-economic 
dimension through proposing to conduct such studies themselves. Indeed, experts trained in 
medico-economics are increasingly being employed by pharmaceutical companies in order 
to either pre-empt or counter HTA studies conducted by public regulators (notably in 
France). Second, Big Pharma and its representatives have encouraged the involvement of 
the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in European co-operation over HTA because this 
organization itself prefers therapeutic to medico-economic evaluations and, until now, has 
largely supported the interests of large originator companies (see Benoît, 2016 for interview 
data on both these points). Meanwhile, however, it is important to grasp that potential 
challengers to Big Pharma, notably smaller generic medicines producers and health insurers, 
have not developed strong arguments and alliances as regards medico-economic evaluation 
at the EU scale. Consequently, through their respective political work, neither set of actors 
                                                     
12
 Interviewed in December 2012, a DG SANCO official working on HTA represented this situation in the following way: 
‘Some member states are still pushing for this. We in the Commission now say, ‘let’s focus first on the clinical dimension, and 
find out its added value in the clinical field’. (…) Meanwhile, of course, discussions about medico-economic evaluations will 
go on alongside in HTAi, etc’. 
13
 Interview, Brussels, December 2012. 
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have equipped themselves for even destabilizing the hegemony of large, multinational 
pharmaceutical companies in this field.  
 
Just as importantly, in the Bureaucratic field actors attracted to medico-economic evaluation 
in principle have in practice channelled their energies and capital elsewhere. A first reason 
for this is that the ‘austerity’ driven cost-cutting of 2009-2013 ran counter to the more 
sophisticated analyses advocated by proponents of medico-economic evaluation. Whereas 
the latter often recommend that certain drugs should no longer be supported by public 
funding, several member states (notably Spain and Greece) simply cut this funding, and thus 
pharmaceutical prices, indiscriminately and without any reference to any sort of 
evaluatioPPn. As a representative of generic medicines underlined on interview, the post 
2008 economic downturn accentuated such practices and even added an EU-scale layer:  
 
‘Our industry has been put under pressure by a new actor: DG ECFIN. It has even given 
specific prescriptions over health and medicines policies to countries like Greece and 
Italy. This is all about cost containment, which raises big problems for health services 
and the pharma industry in the medium and long term’14. 
 
Although the HTA movement, and the medico-economists within it, is opposed to such 
simplistic forms of cost-cutting, its emphasis upon cost-effectiveness has nevertheless long 
been interpreted by pharmaceutical producers as a threat to their turnover, profits and 
business models (Lothgren & Tatcliffe 2004). This fear has also been fuelled by a certain 
number of national pricing bodies who have actually used HTA, and thus medico-economic 
assessment, in this way (e.g. that of the Czech Republic: interviews, Prague, June 2013).  
 
More obviously still, within the Bureuacratic field most national health and industry 
ministries have been very wary as regards what they see as Commission ‘encroachment’ on 
national, treaty-backed prerogatives. Officials from that body are obviously aware of this 
fear and have worked to depoliticize medico-economic evaluation by presenting the 
systematic sharing of data, and thus the pool of ‘knowledge’ it could engender, as a neutral 
‘no brainer’. Indeed, such a framing generates widespread agreement even amongst 
representatives of Big Pharma: 
 
‘Why should we do this exercise 27 times when it could be done only once? Here the 
position of the industry, and of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Associations in any case, has always been clear: we are in favour of one evaluation at 
the European level, as long as it is not on top of national ones’15. 
 
However, putting in place a system for such ‘pooling’ has prompted two overlapping 
debates. The first concerns how this scientific knowledge would be brought together and by 
whom? Moreover, how would it fit with national systems of appraisal? The Commission has 
never actually proposed that evaluating the social worth of a medicine, and thence setting 
its price and level of reimbursement, should be transferred to the scale of the EU. 
Nevertheless, many actors located in different fields fear that an EU-scale assessment 
system could be established and would inexorably threaten national modes of appraisal. For 
                                                     
14
 Interview, Brussels, December 2012. 
15
 Interview, official from the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations (EFPIA), Brussels, June 2010. 
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example, a pharmaceutical company’s representative underlined on interview: ‘National 
public health and reimbursement policies are about the collective interest (…). And what we 
also see is that social actors in the member states (…) all want social policies to remain 
national’16. Indeed, representatives of national ministries of health state clearly that: ‘as 
soon as things slide towards the organization of health care, i.e. to domains that are more 
part of national sovereignty, then we say ‘stop!’17.  
 
In short, framing HTA as incorporating the pooling of both therapeutic and medico-economic 
evaluations strongly incites all actors to ask the question who decides? (the national or the 
EU scale). Faced with this fundamental question of legitimacy, as in many other areas of 
European integration (Radaelli 1999), Commission representatives have sought to side-step 
the who decides? question by working to technicize the problems and instruments at issue. 
Consequently, seemingly consensual methods of discerning the safety of a medicine have 
been legitimized as an EU-scale competence, whereas controversial questions as regards 
how its price is set have been left in the hands of national decision-makers.  
 
In summary, the case of the non-institutionalization of medico-economic evaluation at the 
EU scale provides another example of the weakness of not only the EU’s health policy 
instruments, but also of its social policy more generally. Once again this case has featured a 
weak and intermittent connection of the problem, as defined in the Bureaucratic and 
Economic fields, to the Party political field. Throughout, national ministers have scarcely 
been involved, nor have national or European parliamentarians. Moreover, even the 
Expertise field where HTA and medico-economic evaluation was spawned, has not 
generated sustained mobilizations in order to legitimize even the pooling of methods and 
data at the EU scale as a political priority. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Indeed, the two case studies presented in this paper, together with the conceptual 
framework used to analyse them, have highlighted how power relations and political work 
within the Economic and Bureaucratic fields have been the cause of the weakness of EU 
policy initiatives in the health industry. It is within these fields that ‘the economic’ has 
consistently been framed in such a way as to limit the ambition of measures that do not 
directly concern production and trade, whilst simultaneously precluding transfers of public 
decision-making authority from the national to the EU scale. In so doing, these cases provide 
evidence that what has caused the feebleness of EU social policies more generally lies in the 
degree of autonomy developed by both the Economic and Bureaucratic fields, together with 
the forms of essentially depoliticized political work that have consistently been undertaken 
within them since the late 1940s. 
   
Indeed, this paper confirms that taking a long term view enables research to engender the 
deepest explanations of European integration and its crucial relationship to the capitalisms 
of Europe. As Laurent Warlouzet convincingly shows for the period 1973-86, the image of ‘an 
inexorably neoliberal Europe’ is an ‘illusion’ (2018: 214).  This is not only because some 
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 Interview, French pharmaceuticals interest group (le LEEM), Paris, October 2010. 
17
 Interview, French Ministry of Health, Paris, November 2010. 
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outcomes of EU decision-making have not just concerned the operation of ‘free markets’18. 
More fundamentally, there has been no neoliberal inexorability because throughout the 
EU’s history of decision-making, other alternatives have consistently been discussed, 
discarded or adopted only in part. Research could do much better in analysing this 
disqualification or dilution of alternatives. The concepts of fields and political work provide a 
robust framework and set of methods for tackling such an agenda head on.  
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